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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of foreign institutional ownership on stock 
liquidity in a sample of 950 firm-year observations from 190 companies listed in the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), over the period from 2011 to 2015. Multiple 
regressions were used to examine the relationships between foreign institutional 
ownership and liquidity measures. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) were also employed 
to ensure that the regression results were not susceptible to endogeneity problems. After 
controlling for price, return volatility, and firm size, the results indicated that equity 
ownership by foreign institutional investors has a negative impact on stock liquidity. 
The results remain robust even after controlling for endogeneity. The findings of this 
paper suggest that foreign institutional ownership may increase the degree of 
information asymmetry between foreign and local investors, and that foreign 
institutional investors adopt a buy-and-hold strategy following their high ownership in 
local firms. Both the higher information asymmetry and the inactive trading activity 
reduce liquidity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely accepted that foreign 
investors are key players in emerging 
stock markets. Over recent years, the level 
of ownership and the volume of stock 
traded by foreign investors, mostly 
foreign institutions, in emerging markets, 
has increased dramatically in response to 
worldwide financial deregulation and the 
openness of local stock markets. The 
participation of foreign institutional 
investors is expected to bring benefits to 
domestic markets, with one such benefit 
being the enhancement of local market 
liquidity (Rhee & Wang, 2009).  
This paper aims to investigate 
whether higher equity ownership by 
foreign institutions is associated with 
better  liquidity  of  firms in an emerging
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market, namely, Thailand. It is interesting 
to examine the Thai capital market in 
relation to this issue for the following 
reasons:  
Firstly, the characteristics of the Thai 
capital market are dramatically different 
from those of the U.S. and most other 
developed markets. In particular, the 
stock market in Thailand is younger, 
smaller, less sophisticated, more volatile, 
and substantially less liquid. According to 
Rhee and Wang (2009), the lack of 
liquidity is a key determinant for high 
volatility in emerging markets and can 
impede stock market development. 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) 
and Agudelo (2010) have also indicated 
that investors tend to consider liquidity as 
a crucial factor when making investments 
in emerging markets, as their returns can 
be substantially reduced after accounting 
for liquidity costs. Despite the importance 
of stock liquidity for an emerging market 
such as Thailand, only a limited number 
of studies have been undertaken in this 
area (for example, Pavabutr & Sirodom, 
2010; Udomsirikul, Jumreornvong, & 
Jiraporn, 2011; Prommin, Jumreornvong, 
& Jiraporn, 2014; and Thanatawee, 2016). 
Secondly, Thailand is an emerging 
market where foreign institutional 
investors have played a pivotal role. Over 
the period from 2011 to 2015, daily 
trading by foreign investors accounted for 
as much as 22 per cent of the total daily 
trading value in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET). Moreover, the average 
daily trading value of foreign investors 
has increased substantially from 6.7 
billion baht (USD 211 million) to 9.8 
billion baht (USD 272 million) over the 
same period. Similar to those in other 
emerging markets, the trading activities of 
foreign investors in Thailand appear to be 
dominated by institutional investors who 
typically have an informational advantage 
over other types of investors. Due to the 
increasing roles of foreign institutions in 
the Thai equity market, an investigation 
into the link between foreign institutional 
ownership and liquidity is therefore 
essential. 
The results from this study show that 
equity ownership by foreign institutions 
in Thai firms has a negative impact on 
liquidity. One possible explanation is that 
the information asymmetry between 
foreign and local investors increases 
when foreign institutional investors hold 
more shares. In an emerging market like 
Thailand, foreign investors tend to have a 
large informational advantage over local 
investors, thereby leading to lower 
liquidity. Previous studies document that 
increased foreign ownership is associated 
with higher information asymmetry and 
lower liquidity (Brockman & Yan, 2009; 
Rhee & Wang, 2009; Ng, Wu, Yu, & 
Zhang, 2016; Vo, 2016). Another possible 
explanation may be related to the inactive 
trading by foreign institutional investors. 
As noted by Rhee and Wang (2009), it is 
unnecessary for foreign institutional 
investors to extract more information 
from trading as they are typically large 
shareholders, and often become corporate 
insiders. Accordingly, foreign institu-
tional investors usually adopt a buy-and-
hold investment strategy and trade less 
often, thus decreasing liquidity.  
This paper contributes to the existing 
finance literature in several ways. Firstly, 
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the findings of this paper shed some light 
on the inconclusive evidence regarding 
the liquidity impact of foreign institu-
tional ownership by showing that 
liquidity deteriorates with higher 
ownership of foreign institutions. 
Secondly, most previous studies that have 
considered the effect of foreign insti-
tutional ownership on liquidity have been 
carried out using data from developed 
markets, while data from emerging 
markets has rarely been investigated. This 
study therefore offers better insights into 
the roles of foreign institutional investors 
in emerging markets. Particularly, the 
results of the current paper are consistent 
with those in other emerging markets such 
as Rhee and Wang (2009) in Indonesia 
and Vo (2016) in Vietnam. Thirdly, 
research regarding the effect of foreign 
institutional ownership on liquidity in 
Thailand has hardly been explored. 
Hence, this study addresses this issue in 
the Thai stock market.    
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The presence of foreign institutions 
in the local stock market is generally 
believed to help enhance liquidity. 
However, the existing empirical evidence 
regarding the relationship between 
foreign institutional ownership and 
liquidity remains inconclusive. 
Theoretically, two competing hypotheses 
have often been cited to explain the 
impact of foreign institutional ownership 
on liquidity: the information asymmetry 
hypothesis and the trading hypothesis. 
The information asymmetry hyp-
othesis predicts a negative relationship 
between foreign institutional ownership 
and liquidity. It proposes that certain 
types of investors such as insiders, large 
shareholders, and institutions are better 
informed regarding firm value than 
outside retail investors. Knowing that 
they are at a disadvantage, less informed 
investors are less willing to trade against 
better informed investors, leading to a 
decline in liquidity (Grossman & Stiglitz, 
1980; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 
1985; Easley & O'Hara, 1987). In 
comparison to local investors, foreign 
investors, who are normally institutional 
investors, tend to have superior invest-
ment skills, more experience in global 
capital markets, and higher access to large 
financial databases (Kalev, Nguyen, & 
Oh, 2008; Vo, 2016). These advantages 
increase the information asymmetry 
between foreign institutional investors 
and local investors, thereby impairing 
liquidity.  
The information asymmetry 
hypothesis is supported by several prior 
studies. For example, Rubin (2007) and 
Brockman and Yan (2009) found that 
larger institutional ownership is 
associated with a higher probability of 
informed trading. Similarly, Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) found that changes in 
institutional holdings were associated 
with trading of private information. In a 
related study, Rhee and Wang (2009) 
showed that foreign institutional share-
holdings have a negative impact on the 
future liquidity of firms listed in the 
Indonesian stock market. Likewise, a 
study by Vo (2016) documents a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership 
and the liquidity of firms in Vietnam. 
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Examining a large sample of 27,828 firms 
from thirty-nine countries worldwide, Ng 
et al. (2016) found that foreign ownership 
is negatively associated with stock 
liquidity.    
The trading hypothesis, on the other 
hand, predicts a positive relationship 
between foreign institutional ownership 
and liquidity. It proposes that higher 
turnover of portfolios can help reduce 
transaction costs and thus enhance 
liquidity (Demsetz, 1968; Kothare & 
Laux, 1995; Domowitz, Glen, & 
Madhavan, 2001). According to Zheng 
and Li (2008), market makers have an 
incentive to quote narrower spreads and 
larger depths, as doing so increases the 
number of traders and thus lowers the 
probability of informed trading, leading to 
higher liquidity. When the ownership is 
highly concentrated, however, there are 
fewer trades due to the lower number of 
shareholders, thereby decreasing liquidity 
(Heflin & Shaw, 2000; Rubin, 2007; 
Jacoby & Zheng, 2010). 
Several prior studies document a 
positive effect of institutional ownership 
on liquidity, which is consistent with the 
trading hypothesis. Jennings, Schnatterly, 
and Seguin (2002) found that higher 
institutional ownership leads to narrower 
spreads of stocks traded on NASDAQ. 
Examining firms listed on NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ, Bennett, Sias, 
and Starks (2003) found that an increase 
in institutional ownership forecasts higher 
turnover. Likewise, Rubin (2007) 
reported that the level of institutional 
ownership is positively correlated to the 
liquidity of firms on NYSE, suggesting 
that institutional investors trade more 
often than other investors. Similarly, a 
recent study by Ajina, Lakhal, and 
Sougné, (2015) revealed that institutional 
investors have a positive and significant 
effect on the liquidity of listed companies 
in France. The authors argue that frequent 
trading by institutional investors helps 
lower trading costs and enhance liquidity.  
Given the competing hypotheses and 
the mixed empirical evidence as 
discussed above, the prediction regarding 
the impact of foreign institutional 
ownership on liquidity in Thailand is 
therefore ambiguous. Accordingly, the 
following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: Consistent with the information 
asymmetry hypothesis, there is a 
negative relationship between 
foreign institutional ownership and 
liquidity.  
H2:  Consistent with the trading hypo-
thesis, there is a positive 
relationship between foreign 
institutional ownership and 
liquidity. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
This study analyses a sample of 
companies listed in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) over the period from 2011 
to 2015. The data for liquidity, foreign 
institutional ownership and control 
variables were obtained from 
SETSMART, the database provided by 
the SET. The initial sample consisted of 
1,290 firm-year observations. After 
deleting outliers and firms with missing 
trading data, the final sample consisted of 
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950 firm-year observations from 190 
firms. 
 
Model Specification 
 
The relationship between foreign 
institutional ownership and stock liquidity 
was estimated as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∗
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡               
     (1) 
 
where all variables are described below. 
The relationship of the variables in 
equation (1) was first estimated by the 
panel least squares method. It was then 
analysed using both fixed effects and 
random effects panel estimators. 
Furthermore, a two-stage least square 
(2SLS) was employed to ensure that the 
results were not susceptible to 
endogeneity problems. 
 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is stock 
liquidity (LIQi,t), measured by three 
alternative dimensions: relative spread 
(RSPREAD), Amihud’s illiquidity ratio 
(ILLIQ), and the liquidity ratio (LR). 
 
 
1 This paper measures bid-ask spreads at the end of the day because there is no intraday data 
available from SETSMART. This approach was employed by Gorkittisunthorn, Jumreornvong, 
and Limpaphayom (2006). Rhee and Wang (2009) also measured the bid-ask spreads at the 
end of the day for the Indonesian stock market. 
 
 
Relative Spread 
Relative spread (RSPREAD) is 
calculated as the difference between the 
ask price and the bid price at the end of 
the day1, divided by the average of the 
two prices. This liquidly measure is used 
by prior studies such as Ginglinger and 
Hamon (2007), Rhee and Wang (2009), 
and Jacoby and Zheng (2010). Relative 
spread is a measure of illiquidity since 
wider bid-ask spread reduces the 
probability of trades. 
 RSPREAD𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 = (Ask𝑖𝑖.𝑑𝑑−Bid𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑)(Ask𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑+Bid𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑) 2⁄         (2) 
 
where Ask𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑  and Bid𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑  are the best ask 
and best bid prices of stock i, respectively, 
at the end of trading day d. 
  
Amihud’s Illiquidity Ratio 
 Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) is 
calculated as the daily absolute return 
over the daily trading value. This 
illiquidity ratio was initially developed by 
Amihud (2002) and later widely 
employed by many other researchers such 
as Rubin (2007), Jiang, Kim, and Zhou 
(2011), Udomsirikul et al. (2011), and 
Prommin, Jumreornvong, Jiraporn, and 
Tong (2016). 
 ILLIQ𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 =  �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑� 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑�      (3) 
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where �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑� is the absolute return of stock 
i on day d, and 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 is the trading value of 
stock i on day d (million Baht). 
 
Liquidity Ratio 
 The liquidity ratio (LR) is computed 
as the daily trading volume over the 
absolute stock return. According to 
Prommin et al. (2014), the liquidity ratio 
can be used as a measure of the ability of 
a stock to absorb a large amount of trading 
volume without a significant price 
change. It is employed by several studies 
as a proxy for stock liquidity (for 
example, Amihud, Mendelson, & 
Lauterbach, 1997; Berkman & 
Eleswarapu, 1998; Prommin et al., 2014).  
 LR𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ �VOL𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑� ∑ ��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑��𝑡𝑡�𝑡𝑡    (4) 
 
where VOL𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑  is the trading volume of 
stock i on day d, and �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑� is the absolute 
return of stock i on day d. 
 
Independent Variables 
 The main independent variable is 
foreign institutional ownership (FINST), 
the proportion of shares held by foreign 
institutional investors. This paper 
includes three control variables that have 
been regularly employed in prior studies 
(for example, Ginglinger & Hamon, 
2007; Rhee & Wang, 2009; Jacoby & 
Zheng, 2010). These variables are share 
price (PRICE), return volatility 
(VOLAT), and market capitalisation 
(MCAP). Share price is used to capture 
the extent to which a higher share price 
tends to have wider bid-ask spreads. 
Return volatility, the standard deviation 
of daily returns over the year, is included 
as more volatile stock tends to have wider 
bid-ask spreads and a higher price impact. 
Market capitalisation is included to 
control for the effect of firm size on 
liquidity, since larger firms tend to have 
higher stock liquidity than smaller ones. 
In addition, year dummies and industry 
dummies 2  are included to control for 
macroeconomic variations and possible 
industry effects, respectively. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the sample. It shows that the 
stock liquidity measured by relative 
spread (RSPREAD), Amihud’s illiquidity 
ratio (ILLIQ), and liquidity ratio (LR), 
which take the average values of 1.08 per 
cent, 14.6634, and 2.2418, respectively. 
The average level of foreign institutional 
ownership (FINST) is 21.28 per cent. 
Regarding the control variables, the mean 
values of the daily closing share price 
(PRICE), return volatility (VOLAT), and 
market capitalisation (MCAP) are 
33.7460 Baht, 2.1435, and 24,338 million 
Baht, respectively. 
 
 
2 There are eight industries as classified by the SET, that is, agriculture and food, 
consumer products, financials, industrials, property and construction, resources, 
services, and technology. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
RSPREAD 0.0108 0.0084 0.0031 0.0626 0.0075 
ILLIQ 14.6634 0.4543 0.0009 317.9858 41.4668 
LR 2.2418 0.7501 0.0003 26.8598 3.6181 
FINST 21.2808 14.2800 0.0000 97.1200 21.3143 
PRICE 33.7460 15.1100 0.6900 380.3400 50.0129 
VOLAT 2.1435 1.9800 0.4500 6.6700 0.8269 
MCAP  24,338 6,373 69.3400 405,625 52,124 
Notes: RSPREAD is the difference between the ask price and the bid price, divided by the average of 
the two prices (%). ILLIQ is the ratio of the daily absolute return to the daily trading value in million 
Baht. LR is the ratio of the total daily trading volume to the total absolute value of stock returns. FINST 
is the percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors. PRICE is the daily closing share price 
(Baht). VOLAT is the standard deviation of daily returns over the year. MCAP is the daily market 
capitalisation of stock (million Baht). 
Table 2 presents the level of foreign 
institutional ownership ranked by the 
market capitalisation quintile. It is notable 
that the average ownership by foreign 
institutions in Thai firms over the sample 
period increases substantially from 15.45 
per cent in the bottom quintile to 27.08 per 
cent in the top quintile. Additionally, in 
each particular year from 2011 to 2015, 
the data displays a sizable increase in 
foreign institutional ownership from the 
bottom quintile to the top quintile. These 
results suggest that foreign institutional
investors prefer to hold shares in larger 
firms. 
 
Univariate Test of Liquidity Differences 
 
Table 3 reports the differences in 
liquidity when the sample is subdivided 
into high and low groups by the mean 
values of the independent variables. The 
results show that the ILLIQ for firms with 
higher FINST is significantly higher than 
that for firms with lower FINST. This 
finding  reveals  that   firms  with   higher 
 
 
   Table 2: Foreign Institutional Ownership Ranked by Market Capitalisation 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Bottom quintile 17.56 16.37 16.53 13.57 13.23 15.45 
Quintile 2 14.17 17.06 15.85 17.44 17.49 16.40 
Quintile 3 20.76 24.13 24.44 24.48 23.18 23.40 
Quintile 4 26.69 23.43 24.31 22.96 22.96 24.07 
Top quintile 27.49 28.04 26.66 25.76 27.47 27.08 
Average 21.33 21.80 21.56 20.84 20.87 21.28 
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Table 3: Univariate Tests of Liquidity Differences 
 
 
foreign institutional ownership have 
lower stock liquidity. In addition, the 
results indicate that firms with a higher 
stock price (PRICE) have lower liquidity, 
as they have significantly higher 
RSPREAD, higher ILLIQ and lower LR. 
Similar findings are obtained for firms 
with a higher return volatility (VOLAT). 
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that 
larger firms (higher MCAP) have higher 
liquidity, as shown by a significantly 
lower RSPREAD, lower ILLIQ, and 
higher LR. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Table 4 provides the correlation 
matrix of variables used in this study. It 
shows that FINST has a positive and 
significant correlation with RSPREAD, 
suggesting that liquidity deteriorates as 
the number of shares held by foreign 
institutional investors increases. PRICE is 
found to be positively correlated with 
ILLIQ but negatively correlated with LR. 
This suggests that higher stock prices are 
associated with lower liquidity. A positive 
correlation coefficient between VOLAT 
and RSPREAD indicates that a higher 
return volatility is associated with lower 
liquidity. However, a positive correlation 
between VOLAT and LR seems to 
contradict the general expectation that 
higher return volatility should be related 
to a lower liquidity ratio. Nevertheless, it 
might be possible that stock with a higher 
trading volume has higher return 
Independent 
variables 
          RSPREAD                 ILLIQ                  LR 
High Low Diff. High Low Diff. High Low Diff. 
FINST 0.0111 0.0103 0.0008 
(1.551) 
16.7397 11.3306 5.4091** 
(2.098) 
2.0906 2.3547 -0.2641 
(-1.097) 
PRICE 0.0121 0.0103 0.0178*** 
(2.775) 
16.1502  10.8877 5.2624** 
(2.374) 
1.3269 2.6329 -1.3059*** 
(-5.468) 
VOLAT 0.0129 0.0099 0.0021*** 
(3.945) 
20.6516 10.1975 10.4541*** 
(3.552) 
1.8753  2.7647 -0.8894*** 
(-3.636) 
MCAP 0.0065 0.0119 -0.0054*** 
(-17.389) 
0.1243 18.4000 -18.2757*** 
(-10.923) 
4.2841 1.7187 2.5654*** 
(7.161) 
Notes: The sample is divided into high and low groups using the mean values of the independent variables. 
RSPREAD is the difference between the ask price and the bid price, divided by the average of the two 
prices (%). ILLIQ is the ratio of the daily absolute return to the daily trading value in million Baht. LR is 
the ratio of the total daily trading volume to the total absolute value of stock returns. FINST is the 
percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors. PRICE is the daily closing share price (Baht). 
VOLAT is the standard deviation of daily returns over the year. MCAP is the daily market capitalisation 
of stock (million Baht). t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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volatility. 3  Furthermore, the results 
indicate that larger firms tend to have 
higher liquidity, as shown by a negative 
correlation between MCAP and 
RSPREAD, a negative correlation 
between MCAP and ILLIQ, and a positive 
correlation between MCAP and LR. 
Finally, it can be seen that the correlations 
between any pair of independent variables 
lie between -0.7 and 0.7. According to 
Lind, Marchal, and Wathen (2010), a 
correlation coefficient ranging between -
0.7 and 0.7, for any pair of independent 
variables, indicates that there is no 
collinearity problem in the regression 
analysis.
Foreign Institutional Ownership and 
Liquidity  
 
The relationship between foreign 
institutional ownership and liquidity was 
first estimated using the panel least 
squares method. The results from Models 
(1) and (2) in Table 5 indicate that FINST 
has positive and significant relationships 
with RSPEARD and ILLIQ. These 
findings reveal that higher foreign 
institutional ownership leads to wider 
spread and a higher illiquidity ratio, thus 
lower stock liquidity.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable RSPREAD ILLIQ LR FINST PRICE VOLAT MCAP 
RSPREAD 1       
ILLIQ 0.837*** 1      
LR -0.742*** -0.758*** 1     
FINST 0.068** -0.049 -0.003 1    
PRICE 0.002 0.136*** -0.479*** 0.088*** 1   
VOLAT 0.200*** 0.031 0.125*** 0.005 -0.163*** 1  
MCAP -0.619*** -0.779*** 0.473*** 0.197*** 0.393*** -0.137*** 1 
 
Notes: RSPREAD is the difference between the ask price and the bid price, divided by the average of 
the two prices (%). ILLIQ is the ratio of the daily absolute return to the daily trading value in million 
Baht. LR is the ratio of the total daily trading volume to the total absolute value of stock returns. FINST 
is the percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors. PRICE is the daily closing share price 
(Baht). VOLAT is the standard deviation of daily returns over the year. MCAP is the daily market 
capitalisation of stock (million Baht). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
3 As noted by Prommin et al. (2016), the correlation results should be interpreted 
cautiously as they do not control for several factors that influence liquidity. 
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Table 5: Regression Results between Foreign Institutional Ownership and 
Liquidity 
 Panel least squares Panel fixed effects 
Dependent variable RSPREAD ILLIQ LR RSPREAD ILLIQ LR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept -3.4251*** 
(-37.1626) 
11.8921*** 
(25.9214) 
-7.5611*** 
( -25.2275) 
-3.0727*** 
(-13.2697) 
13.1477***  
(12.7415) 
-7.5278*** 
(-11.4229) 
FINST 0.0015*** 
(2.7489) 
0.0169*** 
(6.1061) 
-0.0123*** 
(-6.8117) 
0.0044*** 
(3.0014) 
0.0349*** 
5.3846 
-0.0244*** 
(-5.8943) 
Ln(PRICE) 0.0947*** 
(9.8626) 
0.3365*** 
(7.0417) 
-1.3498*** 
(-43.2300) 
-0.0625*** 
(-2.7808) 
-0.3318*** 
(-3.3124) 
-0.8744*** 
(-13.6688) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.2120*** 
(6.7033) 
-0.4619*** 
(-2.9337) 
0.7592*** 
(7.3805) 
0.1409*** 
(5.3619) 
-0.0174 
(-0.1487) 
0.5674*** 
(7.5884) 
Ln(MCAP) -0.2103*** 
(-22.8641) 
-1.6156*** 
(-35.2890) 
1.2078*** 
(40.3800) 
-0.1798*** 
(-6.2469) 
-1.5039*** 
(-11.1253) 
1.0293*** 
(12.5656) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 51.89% 68.10% 79.42% 82.86% 90.89% 83.86% 
N 950 950 950 950 950 950 
Notes: RSPREAD is the difference between the ask price and the bid price, divided by the average of the 
two prices (%). ILLIQ is the ratio of the daily absolute return to the daily trading value in million Baht. LR 
is the ratio of the total daily trading volume to the total absolute value of stock return. FINST is the 
percentage of shares held by foreign institutional investors. PRICE is the daily closing share price (Baht). 
VOLAT is the standard deviation of daily returns over the year. MCAP is the daily market capitalisation 
of stock (million Baht). All liquidity variables were transformed by taking the natural logarithm. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
In addition, the results from Model 
(3) show that FINST is negatively and 
significantly related to LR. This finding 
indicates that higher foreign institutional 
ownership is associated with a lower 
ability of stock to absorb a larger trading 
volume. Therefore, the results from the 
panel least squares show that foreign 
institutional ownership has a negative 
impact on stock liquidity, thereby 
supporting the information asymmetry 
hypothesis as proposed in H1. 
The data was further analysed using 
both fixed effects and random effects 
panel estimators. The fixed effects model 
was estimated to account for 
heterogeneity within the firms. The 
random effects model was estimated to 
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capture heterogeneity between firms. For 
the random effects estimator to be 
unbiased in a large sample, however, the 
effects must be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, an assumption that 
is often violated (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 
2012). In this regard, Hausman tests can 
be carried out to test the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between random effects 
and explanatory variables. In the present 
dataset, the Hausman test results 
suggested a preference for the fixed 
effects estimation. Thus, to conserve 
space, the results for the random effects 
estimations were not reported.  
The results for fixed effects 
estimations are shown in Models (4), (5), 
and (6). The results indicate that the 
coefficient for FINST is significant and 
positive in Models (4) and (5) and 
significant but negative in Model (6). 
These findings reveal that the relative 
spread is wider, illiquidity ratio is higher, 
and the liquidity ratio is lower when 
foreign institutional investors hold more 
shares. Consistent with the results from 
the panel least squares estimations, the 
results from the fixed effects estimations 
confirm that foreign institutional 
ownership has a negative effect on 
liquidity. 
Overall, the regression results of the 
panel data estimations reported in Table 5 
indicate that liquidity deteriorates when 
foreign institutional investors increase 
their equity ownership in Thai firms. 
These findings are consistent with the 
information asymmetry hypothesis and 
support the results of studies in other 
emerging markets such as Rhee and 
Wang’s (2009) study in the Indonesian 
stock market and Vo’s (2016) study in the 
Vietnam stock market. In addition, the 
findings are consistent with the negative 
liquidity impact of institutional investors 
in developed markets (Heflin & Shaw, 
2000, Rubin, 2007), and are also in line 
with several studies showing that 
institutional investors are likely to trade 
on informational advantage (Ali, 
Durtschi, Lev, & Trombley, 2004; Bushee 
& Goodman, 2007; Yan & Zhang, 2009). 
The negative liquidity impact of 
foreign institutional ownership in the Thai 
stock market may also be explained by the 
inactive trading of foreign institutions. As 
pointed out by Rhee and Wang (2009), 
foreign institutional investors are 
typically large shareholders in emerging 
markets and their high ownership often 
makes them corporate insiders, leading to 
a large informational advantage over 
outside investors. Accordingly, foreign 
institutions have no need to trade 
frequently for price discovery and tend to 
adopt a buy-and-hold strategy, leading to 
inactive trading which reduces stock 
market liquidity. 
 
Possible Endogeneity 
 In this section, a two-stage least 
square (2SLS) was estimated to ensure 
that the regression results obtained in the 
previous section were not susceptible to 
an endogeneity problem. This paper 
employs two instrumental variables, 
similar to those used in the study of 
Prommin et al. (2016). The first 
instrument predicted was FINST. It was 
constructed by making a linear projection 
from each firm’s foreign institutional 
ownership in 2011 to the average foreign 
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institutional ownership of the sample in 
2015. The second instrument was the 
industry-median FINST. The reason for 
using this variable as an instrument is that 
the industry-level of foreign institutional 
ownership should be highly correlated 
with the firm-level foreign institutional 
ownership, while firm-level liquidity is 
unlikely to be affected by industry-level 
foreign institutional ownership.  
  
 Table 6: 2SLS Regressions between Foreign Institutional Ownership and 
Liquidity 
 First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable FINST RSPREAD ILLIQ LR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 10.6584 (1.6956) 
 
-3.7511*** 
(-10.0550) 
11.0276*** 
(7.5076) 
-6.5522*** 
( -7.4941) 
Predicted FINST 0.0995*** (3.7091) 
 
   
Industry-median FINST 0.4339*** (3.1574)    
FINST  0.0393*** (3.5571) 
0.1442*** 
(3.3101) 
-0.0747*** 
(-2.8804) 
Ln(PRICE) -0.8234 (-1.4896) 
0.9649*** 
(31.0470) 
-0.2445*** 
(-1.9981) 
-0.9146*** 
(-12.5558) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.2515 (0.3871) 
0.1227*** 
(3.4699) 
-0.0751 
(-0.5397) 
0.5939*** 
(7.1699) 
Ln(MCAP) 0.4631 (0.6444) 
-0.1921*** 
(-5.0028) 
-1.5426*** 
(-10.2028) 
1.0741*** 
(11.6349) 
Industry dummies No No No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 94.69% 96.37% 87.47% 93.29% 
Sargan statistic  2.5023 0.8831 2.4654 
p-value  0.1137 0.3473 0.1164 
N 950 950 950 950 
Notes: RSPREAD is the difference between the ask price and the bid price, divided by the average of the two prices 
(%). ILLIQ is the ratio of the daily absolute return to the daily trading value in million Baht. LR is the ratio of the 
total daily trading volume to the total absolute value of stock returns. FINST is the percentage of shares held by 
foreign institutional investors. PRICE is the daily closing share price (Baht). VOLAT is the standard deviation of 
daily returns over the year. MCAP is the daily market capitalisation of stock (million Baht). All liquidity variables 
are transformed by taking the natural logarithm.t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 presents the 2SLS results. In 
the first stage, the dependent variable is 
FINST. The results from Model (1) show 
that both instrumental variables are highly 
significant at the 1 per cent level, 
indicating that the instruments are not 
weak. In the second stage, the results 
show that the coefficients on FINST are 
negative and significant in Models (2) and 
(3) with RSPREAD and ILLIQ as the 
dependent variables, and that the 
coefficient on FINST is positive and 
significant in Model (4) with LR as the 
dependent variable. Consistent with the 
regression results, the 2SLS results 
demonstrate that higher foreign 
institutional ownership is associated with 
lower liquidity. To check the validity of 
the instrumental variables, the Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions was 
performed. Since the Sargan statistics 
were insignificant, both instruments were 
identified as acceptable. Overall, the 
2SLS results are in line with the 
regression results in Table 5, suggesting 
that the endogeneity problem is not likely 
to be a serious issue in this study. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
Foreign institutions have 
dramatically increased their investments 
in emerging markets over recent years. An 
increased participation of foreign 
institutional investors is normally 
expected to enhance local market 
liquidity. This paper tests whether this 
expectation materializes in an emerging 
market like Thailand, by employing a 
dataset containing firms listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) over 
the period from 2011 to 2015. After 
controlling for stock characteristics and 
correcting for potential problems of 
endogeneity, the evidence indicates that 
higher foreign institutional ownership is 
associated with lower liquidity. The 
findings are robust to different liquidity 
measures.  
One possible reason explaining the 
negative impact of foreign institutional 
ownership on the liquidity of Thai firms, 
is that foreign institutional ownership 
exacerbates the information asymmetry 
between foreign and local investors. 
Another possibility is that the high equity 
ownership by foreign institutions makes 
them corporate insiders. With a great 
informational advantage, foreign 
institutional investors do not need to trade 
often for price discovery and tend to adopt 
a buy-and-hold strategy, which leads to 
inactive trading and also contributes to 
lower liquidity. Additionally, high foreign 
institutional ownership may result in 
ownership concentration, which also 
impairs liquidity.  
The findings have implications from 
both managerial and academic points of 
view regarding the link between foreign 
institutional ownership and liquidity in 
Thailand. For policymakers and 
managers, attempts should be made to 
reduce information asymmetry by closely 
monitoring foreign institutional 
shareholding and adopting measures to 
reduce ownership concentration (for 
example, increasing the free float). In 
addition, liquidity can be enhanced 
through better corporate governance 
mechanisms. For investors, the 
information regarding the liquidity impact 
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of foreign institutional ownership can 
help them to make better decisions on 
investments in the Thai stock market. 
Since the findings of this study may 
be applicable only to listed companies in 
Thailand, future research should try to 
extend the analysis to other emerging 
markets. Future studies may be required, 
to examine the liquidity impact of other 
factors, such as domestic institutional 
ownership, ownership dispersion, and 
insider trading. It would also be 
interesting to investigate the impact of 
foreign institutional ownership on stock 
return volatility. 
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